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Hunkins: Criminal Jurisdiction in the National Parks - A Clarification

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN THE
NATIONAL PARKS--A CLARIFICATION
During the year 1966, the 50th anniversary of the
National Park Service, a record 137 million Americans will
visit the 231 areas administered by the Service. An increasingly pressing problem for the Service's Ranger Division is
the effective and efficient administration of justice. During
the 1965 calendar year a service wide report showed a 35.7%
increase in serious offenses. They included murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny and auto theft.
These offenses totalled 1,284 compared to 946 in 1964. In
addition there were 25,060 misdemeanors and petty crimes
reported for the same period. The "petty crimes" involved
attacks on persons and property; lewd and disorderly conduct; traffic, boating and fishing violations; vandalism; etc.
To complete the picture, 1,842 traffic accidents resulting in
property damage totaling $947,024 were investigated by
National Park Service officers.'
Unfortunately, those who prey on the public at home
have found him to be an "easy mark" at his weekend retreat
and in his summer vacation spots. The increase in crime in
the National Parks "may logically be attributed to our unique
exposures. For example, park visitors being on the so-called
carefree vacation, are not likely to be overly security-conscious
of their persons or property, and are ideal prey for the
criminal .... ."'
As it relates to the National Parks, the concept of jurisdiction, that is, the authority, power, or right to act, has been
an elusive one. The courts and administrative agencies of
the federal government have spoken of three "types" of
jurisdiction: exclusive, concurrent, and proprietary.
Areas of exclusive jurisdiction are" federal reservations"
or "federal enclaves" over which state and local governments
have no authority.' Exclusive jurisdiction is acquired by
three means: 1) Federal acquisition of land with state consent
under Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States
National Park Service, Informational Memorandum Analysis of Summary
Reports--Law Enforcement and Traffic Safety, 1965 Calendar Year.
2. Ibid.
3. Examples of National Parks under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States are: Yellowstone, Yosemite, Rocky Mountain.
1.
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Constitution; 2) Through the transfer of jurisdiction by
cessation from the state to the federal government ;4 3) Finally, by retaining exclusive legislative jurisdiction over a
federally owned area within the state at the time the state
is admitted to the Union.5
Where the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction,
the National Park Service is free to react to the rising incidents of criminal activity by dedicating more manpower to
the prevention effort and by practicing police routines in a
more professional manner. In these areas the Service is
master of its own criminal house.
The authority of the federal government to deal with
criminal matters in those National Parks where the United
States does not have exclusive jurisdiction is infinitely less
clear. The applicability of many of the federal criminal
statutes is also in doubt in these areas.
The term "concurrent jurisdiction" has been used to
define that kind of jurisdiction which arises when a state
reserves to itself in a consent or cessation statute the right
to exercise concurrently with the United States, all of the
authority which would otherwise amount to exclusive federal
jurisdiction.6 Where both state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first takes cognizance
of a matter has the right to retain it to a conclusion.7
For reasons which shall be discussed later, it is submitted
that a better definition of concurrent criminal jurisdiction
as it applies to the National Parks might be: The authority
of a state to enforce such criminal laws as are not inconsistent
with federal statutes and regulations, in a manner which
does not interfere with the federal function in the area.
The National Park Service has defined "proprietary
jurisdiction" as those instances in which the federal government has acquired some right or title to an area in a state
but has not obtained any measure of the state's authority
4.
6.
6.
7.

Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
Ibid. (dictum).
See, Annot., 74 L. Ed. 761 (1929).
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
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over the area.8 It has been said that acquisition of "proprietary jurisdiction" is concurrent with any interest of the
United States in real property It is widely assumed that
the United States does not have criminal jurisdiction per se
in areas of proprietary jurisdiction. It is here contended,
also for reasons which shall be examined later, that the term
"proprietary jurisdiction" as it refers to federal criminal
jurisdiction within the National Park System is a non
sequitur.
It is the position of this article that wherever the federal
government operates an area as a National Park, it has at
least concurrent criminal jurisdiction with the state, with
all of the incidents and authority which the term "criminal
jurisdiction" implies. This is a substantial deviation in the
thinking in most "proprietary areas" administered by the
National Park Service. In these areas there is confusion
as to exactly how much authority the Ranger Division has
in investigating criminal matters and from what sources this
authority is derived. Because of the bewildering and indecisive views on the applicability of the federal criminal
statutes in areas of less than exclusive jurisdiction, these
important tools are seldom used in such areas.
AUTHORITY

OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

IN

CRIMINAL MATTERS REGARDLESS OF THE JURISDICTIONAL
STATUS OF

A

PARK

In areas of exclusive jurisdiction the authority of the
federal government to deal with criminal matters has never
been seriously questioned. Article I, section 8, clause 17, of
the Constitution, provides the Congress shall have the power
"To exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings." In such
an area (Yellowstone National Park is a good example) all
of the statutory tools which Congress has provided are free
8. Examples of National Parks under the proprietary jurisdiction of the
United States are: Grand Teton, Grand Canyon, Bryce Canyon.
9. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
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for use and are used by the Protective Division of the park
ranger force.1"
The authority of the federal government to deal with
criminal matters in areas of less than exclusive jurisdiction
stems from three constitutional provisions dealing with property protection and control, Congressional authority to make
all needful laws, and the supremacy of federal laws.
The property clause states that "The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall
be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United
States or of any particular State. ""
The meaning of this clause, the kind of authority derived
from it, and the extent of that authority, have frequently
been clouded by the reported decisions. For instance, in
Ranier National Park Co. v. Martin, the court held the State
of Washington had jurisdiction over lands held by the United
States in a proprietary capacity, but with the important
exception that the State could not exercise any jurisdiction
which would destroy or interfere with the use by the federal
government of the property it had purchased.' 2 The court
did not examine the jurisdiction of the United States over
the area and was content to announce the State had authority
to act if its actions did not interfere with the use of the
federal government.
In its equivocal decision in Camfield v. United States,
the Court said that with respect to public lands belonging
to the United States and located within the boundaries of
a state, the federal government had the rights of an "ordinary
proprietor." It then added the somewhat contradictory proviso that these rights were analagous to the police power of
the States."' With this kind of "tail chasing" it is small
wonder that Park Service officials are unclear as to the kind
and extent of their authority in the "proprietary areas."
10. See generally, Brown, The Administration of Law in Yellowstone National
Park, 14 WYo. L.J. 9 (1959).
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2.
12. Ranier Nat'l Park Co. v. Martin, 18 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1937),
aff'd, 302 U.S. 661 (1938).
13. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
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On the other hand, and in a somewhat more decisive
fashion, the Court stated in McKelvey v. United States that
Congress could prescribe rules respecting the use of the
public lands and in so doing could sanction some uses and
prohibit others.1" In United States v. Trinidad Coal Co., the
Court added that all of the public lands were held in trust
for the citizens of the United States and that it was the
duty of Congress to determine how the trust should be
administered. The Court further stated that administrative
decisions with respect to these lands were rights incident to
proprietorship. But more than this, the Court implied that
the real authority of the United States over these lands
stemmed not from mere proprietorship but from the power
of the United States as a sovereign over the property belonging to it. 5
It would seem that the Trinidad and McKelvey cases
lend credence to the theory that the federal government may
prohibit criminal activity within the confines of the National
Parks. Certainly the criminal element has made growing
use of the Parks and the large concentrations of people
attracted by them for their illegal activity. It follows that
this type of use is one which Congress is constitutionally
empowered to prohibit.
The supreme power of the government to protect its
property is demonstrated by Hunt v. United States, wherein
it was held that a state could not enforce its game laws
against federal employees who, upon direction of the Secretary of Agriculture, 'destroyed a number of wild deer in a
national forest (which was not under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States) because the deer, by overbrowsing
upon and killing young trees, bushes, and forage plants, were
causing damage to the land. The Court said that the conduct
of the federal employees was necessary to protect the lands
of the United States from serious injury. The authorization
given by the Secretary of Agriculture was held to be within
the authority conferred by Congress, and the power of the
federal government to protect its property was said to be
14. McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922); accord, Light v. United
States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
15. United States v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U.S. 160 (1890).
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beyond question regardless of the game laws or any other
state statute."
This principle hardly needs amplification in light of the
supremacy clause. 7 In 1819, Chief Justice Marshall enunciated for the Supreme Court what has become a basic tenet
of American Constitutional law:
If any one proposition could command the universal
assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this:
that the government of the Union, though limited in
its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action ....
But this question is not left to mere reason. The
people have, in express terms, decided it, by saying,
"this Constitution, and the laws of the United States,
which shall be made in pursuance thereof," "shall
be the supreme law of the land" . . .s
By implication, this principle also stands for the proposition that wherever federal criminal statutes or federal
regulations apply they may be enforced without interference
from the state. Conversely, no state statute may be enforced
when its enforcement will interfere with federal policies in
the area.
Article I, section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution states
that the Congress shall have power "To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof." Under this clause, the
federal government has undisputed authority to protect the
proper carrying out of the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution without regard to whether the functions are
carried out on land owned by the United States or by others,
and without regard to the jurisdictional status of the land
upon which the functions are carried out. Where such functions involve federal use of property, the Congress may,
regardless of the jurisdictional status of such property, make
16. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
17. U.S. CONST. art. Vi, cl. 2 provides that, "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."
18. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
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such laws with respect to the property as may be required
for effectively carrying out those functions."
It is submitted that together, these three provisions in
the Constitution (property protection and control of use,
authority to make needful laws, and supremacy of federal
laws) grant to the United States concurrent (with the state)
criminal jurisdiction over those National Parks which are
not under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
Putting it another way, there are only two kinds of criminal
jurisdiction in the National Parks: that which is reserved
to the United States exclusively and that which the United
States exercises concurrently with the state. Further, although
a particular area may be under the concurrent criminal
jurisdiction of the state and of the federal government, the
concurrent criminal jurisdiction which is exercised by the
state cannot and does not extend to any matter that is not
consistent with full power in the United States to protect
its land, to control their use, and to prescribe in what manner
others may acquire rights in them.
FUNCTION AND PURPOSES OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

In determining whether or not criminal sanctions are
"necessary and proper" within the meaning of Article I,
section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution, it becomes necessary
to look at the function and purposes of the federal government within an area which has been designated as a "National
Park." That purpose is set forth in Title 16, section I of
the United States Code:
[The National Park Service] shall promote and
regulate the use of the Federal areas known as
national parks .. . by such means and measures as

conform to the fundamental purpose of the said
parks ...

which purpose is to conserve the scenery

and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same
in such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."0
19. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); accord, James Stewart & Co.
v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940).
20. 39 Stat. 535 (1916), 42 Stat. 1488 (1923), 43 Stat. 1176 (1925), 48 Stat.
389 (1934), 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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If one of the purposes of the Service is to "provide for
the enjoyment" of the national parks it would seem that the
Service is under an affirmative obligation to protect the
visitor from criminal deprivations. It is hard to see how
the obligation could be any less because the deprivation was
rape or theft rather than disorderly conduct or reckless driving. The question is not as foolish as it sounds because in
many areas administered by the Service it is thought that
the federal criminal code does not apply while there seems
to be no question of the applicability of federal regulations
regardless of the jurisdictional status of the area. The Park
Service is not alone in its confusion however. Federal courts
presented with the question of the applicability of federal
criminal statutes in areas of less than exclusive jurisdiction
have held both ways.
Congress apparently felt the Park Service should be
equipped to deal with criminal activity in the national parks.
In Title 16 of the United States Code Congress provided:
All persons employed in the National Park Service
of the United States shall have authority to make
arrests for the violation of the laws and regulations
relating to the national forests and national parks
and any person so arrested shall be taken before
the nearest United States Commissioner, within
whose jurisdiction the national forest or national
park is located, for trial; and upon sworn information by any competent person any United States
Commissioner in the proper jurisdiction shall issue
process for the arrest of any person charged with
the violation of said laws and regulations; but
nothing herein contained shall be construed as preventing the arrest by any officer of the United
States, without process, of any person taken in the
act of violating said laws and regulations.2 1
One of the interesting but unanswered questions presented by this section is whether or not it grants authority
to Park Service officers to arrest persons for violations of
state law in areas of less than exclusive jurisdiction. It is
a question which comes up frequently with regard to viola21.

33 Stat. 873 (1905), 16 U.S.C. § 10 (1964).
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tions of state liquor laws, particularly "minor in possession"
and "open bottle" laws.
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE REGULATIONS

The authority of the Secretary of the Interior to issue
regulations applicable in the national parks is contained in
section 3 of Title 16, United States Code.22 In this section
the Secretary is authorized to make and publish the rules
and regulations he deems necessary. The violation of these
regulations is made punishable by a fine of not more than
$500 or imprisonment for not exceeding 6 months or both.
The authority of the Secretary to make such regulations was
upheld in Robbins v. United States.2"
National Park Service regulations are contained in Title
36 of the Code of Federal Regulations. It has been held that
they have the "force of law."24 These regulations set forth
the management policies of the Department of Interior and
regulate the use of the areas. In the latter function, Title 36
constitutes a limited and incomplete petty offense code. For
instance, regulations concerning reckless driving,2" disorderly
conduct,2" soliciting,2" fraudulently obtaining accommodations,28 limitations on vehicle speed,29 driving under the influence,"0 and "tampering" with a parked motor vehicle,8
are set forth.
22.

39 Stat. 535 (1916), 41 Stat. 732 (1920), 45 Stat. 235 (1928), 72 Stat. 152

(1958), 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).

23. Robbins v. United States, 284 Fed. 39, 45-46 (8th Cir. 1922)
We are of the opinion that the power of the government to regulate
traffic on those highways [within Rocky Mountain National Park] as
it has done by congressional enactment and rules thereby authorized,
rests on the secure footing that it is a valid exercise of control over
the property of the government, even though it is of the nature of
police power, and that it is sustained by section 3, article IV, of the

Federal Constitution, which entitles the government to make all needful

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
81.

regulations respecting its territory and property . . . . Certainly the
duty was imposed upon the Secretary to regulate the traffic on the
highway in a manner that would best promote the safety and accommodation of the public ....
United States v. Petersen, 91 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Cal. 1950), aff'd, 191
F. 2d 154 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951).
36 C.F.R. § 1.58 (1960).
36 C.F.R. § 1.23 (1960).
36 C.F.R. § 1.22 (1960).
36 C.F.R. § 1.26 (1960).
36 C.F.R. § 1.42 (1960).
36 C.F.R. § 1.53 (b) (1960).
36 C.F.R. § 1.64 (1960).
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Within the Protective Division of the ranger force, and
depending a great deal on the individual attitude of the
United States Commissioner in the area, it has become standard operating procedure to make use of the disorderly conduct regulation as a sort of "catch-all" provision. Whether
this is desirable from the standpoint of a fair administration
of justice is open to question. That it is necessary in those
areas of less than exclusive jurisdiction where it is believed
the Federal Criminal Code does not apply, is beyond doubt.
Under that situation the disorderly conduct regulation constitutes the only tool the Protective Division has. This writer
has, on more than one occasion, participated in investigations
which under any other circumstances would have resulted in
charges of larceny, assault, assault and battery, or burglary,
but which terminted by bringing the accused to trial on a
charge of disorderly conduct.
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE

Most of the substantive criminal statutes contained in
Title 18 of the United States Code are operable in areas over
which the United States has "special maritime or territorial
jurisdiction." Section 7 of Title 18 defines territorial jurisdiction as:
Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the
United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of
the legislature of the state in which the same shall
be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal,
'dockyard, or other needful building. 2
The importance of this definition can be seen in Krull
v. United States," which was a prosecution under the federal
rape statute. The government contended that the offenses
were committed in Chickamauga and Chattanooga National
Parks. The court said:
The statute . . . makes rape a crime under federal
law when committed within the special maritime or
32. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1964).
33. Krull v. United States, 240 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 915
(1957).
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territorial jurisdiction of the United States. It

becomes necessary, therefor, not only to prove that
the offenses charged by these two counts were committed, but also to establish the situs where committed
and show that such situs
was within the jurisdiction
34
of the United States.
Three viewpoints have been expressed regarding the kind
of jurisdiction necessary for the federal criminal statutes to
apply. It has been held in numerous cases that the area must
be within the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the federal government."5 These courts have apparently ignored the word "concurrent" used in section 7 of Title 18. On the other hand, in
United States v.Schuster,3 6 the court did recognize that "concurrent" jurisdiction was sufficient to make the federal
criminal statute applicable. Finally, in Mannix v. United
States, the court did not seem at all concerned with the jurisdictional status of the situs of the crime. Attempted rape
"was committed on the grounds of the United States Public
Health Service in Montgomery County, Maryland, the same
being land reserved and acquired for use of the United States
and by reason of this the United States District Court had
jurisdiction."8 ' With such contradiction in the courts it is
not hard to understand why the Ranger Division has been
hesitant to charge suspects with violations of federal criminal
statutes.
The Assimilative Crimes Act 8 (adopting criminal laws
of the states for areas within federal jurisdiction) is made
operable under the same jurisdictional conditions as the other
substantive crimes in Title 18. In fact, the act specifically
refers to the definition of "special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction" contained in section 7. There is no other statute
Id. at 127.
United States v. Lewis, 111 Fed. 630 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1901).
United States v. Schuster, 220 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Va. 1963).
Mannix v. United States, 140 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1944); accord, United
States v. Au Young, 142 F. Supp. 666 (D. Hawaii 1956).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964) provides:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter
reserved or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty
of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any
enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted
within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession or District
in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the
time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and
subject to a like punishment.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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than the Assimilative Crimes Act which would be of greater
help to the National Park Service in its effort to maintain
law and order within the areas it administers. It is, however,
subject to the same question of applicability as the other
federal criminal statutes.
CONCLUSION

Many areas administered by the Park Service are relatively isolated and distant from population centers. Nevertheless, an inordinate number of citizens are drawn to these
areas every year. Because of the influx and concentration
of people there is a very real problem of maintaining law
and order. One of the purposes of the Ranger Division is
the prevention and investigation of illegal activity. The visiting public expects protection from these uniformed officers
and should be entitled to it. Certainly they do not contemplate
(nor do they follow) the practice of making certain types
of complaints to a state law enforcement agency and others
to a federal agency. The existence of two or three (federal,
state, and county) enforcement agencies, 'drawing their
authority from different sources and administering different
laws, is confusing and a source of potential inter-governmental
irritation. The practice followed in most areas of less than
exclusive jurisdiction has been for state and local officers
to demur in favor of the Park Ranger Protective Division.
In such situations, however, state and local officers have
rendered valuable assistance when called upon in time of
emergency.
The withdrawal of state and local officers from the
National Parks has, in most instances, been of necessity.
Because of the isolated nature of the areas and the small
resident population, the States and their sub-divisions have
had neither the manpower nor the funds to police the Parks."0
39. For instance, Grand Teton National Park, a "propriatary" area, is located
in Teton County, Wyoming. According to the 1960 census the county had
a population of 3,620 persons. This year nearly three million persons will
visit Grand Teton National Park. The sheriff's department in Teton County
consists of three men and is located at the county seat in Jackson, some
50 miles south of the North Entrance to the Park. Jackson and the surrounding area also have large crowds of visitors during the "season." The
Jackson Police Department, Teton County Sheriff's Department, and the
Wyoming Highway Patrol are kept extremely busy during this period. It
is impractical and impossible for the Teton County Sheriff to investigate
all of the offenses committed within the Park, to say nothing of attempting
a prevention effort.
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Clearly no state or local law enforcement agency should be
expected or compelled to perform that function.
The whole thrust of this article has been toward the
proposition that federal government does have criminal jurisdiction in the National Parks, regardless of their jurisdictional status. This jurisdiction is derived from the Constitution through the property clause with added vitality from
the necessary and proper clause and the supremacy clause.
Reason and necessity add force to the proposition that
the federal government does not and cannot hold the National
Parks in a "proprietary" capacity. That capacity connotes
an affirmative obligation on the part of the federal government to protect the Park visitor from illegal activity of
whatever sort, and to bring to justice the perpetrators of
that activity. Once it is established that the United States
Government has concurrent criminal jurisdiction in the National Parks, a variety of statutory tools become available
for use in effectively and efficiently administering justice
within these areas. After the jurisdictional problem is hurdled, the worthy goals of crime prevention, detection, and
the apprehension of law breakers, are within the grasp of
the Park Service. Those goals can then be readily achieved
by a dedication of more manpower to the prevention effort
and by practicing police routines in a more professional
manner.
Resolution of the jurisdictional problems can only come
from the courts through an adjudicated case. The answers
to these problems will be given only when the National Park
Service elects to charge suspects, in areas where the United
States does not have exclusive jurisdiction, with violation
of federal criminal statutes and the United States Attorney
in the particular district chooses to prosecute.
RAYMOND B. HUNKINS*

* During the past two years Mr. Hunkins has served the National

Park
Service as a Protective Division Ranger in Grand Teton National Park
outside of Jackson, Wyoming. In this capacity he has specialized in criminal
investigations and prosecutions of petty crimes under Title 36 of the Code
of Federal Regulations.
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